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TO PUBLISH OR NOT TO PUBLISH:
THAT IS THE QUESTION
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier1
A high school principal in Lynchburg, Virginia, sits in her office proof-
reading the soon-to-be-released student newspaper. She comes across an arti-
cle documenting the homosexual activity of several of the school's students.
She fears not only for the students profiled in the story but also the commu-
nity reaction to a school-sponsored paper publishing an article which could be
construed as advocating a homosexual lifestyle.
On the opposite coast, in Berkeley, California, the high school paper
chronicles mercenary activity in Central America by a group of its students
over spring break. The students are committed to the overthrow of any Marx-
ist government on the North American continent. The principal, knowing
many of the local PTA members yearn for the establishment of Marxist gov-
ernments on the North American continent, is concerned not only about the
propriety of the story, but local reaction as well. Attempts to censor the stories
are likely to be met by cries of foul, citing violations of freedom of press and
speech. What's a principal to do?
The United States Supreme Court declared in its 1969 case, Tinker v.
Des Moines School District,2 that public school students do not "shed their
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse
gate."13 Courts dealing with the rights of students look to Tinker for guidance.
Indeed, the trial court in Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier specifically
cited Tinker as the starting point for its analysis of the first amendment rights
issue presented. 4 Before examining the Hazelwood case's treatment of these
issues, an explanation of the underlying facts is necessary.
THE CONTROVERSY
The final issue of Hazelwood East's Spectrum for the 1982-83 school
term was scheduled for publication on May 13.5 On May 10, acting faculty
1. 479 U.S. 1053 (1987).
2. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
3. Id. at 506.
4. Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood School Dist., 607 F. Supp. 1450, 1462 (E.D. Mo.
1985), agreeing with 596 F. Supp 1422 (E.D. Mo. 1984), modifying 578 F. Supp 1286
(E.D. Mo. 1984), rev'd, 795 F.2d 1368 (8th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 108 S. Ct. 562 (1988),
remanded, 840 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1988), afl'g 607 F. Supp. 1450 (E.D. Mo. 1984),
and vacating 795 F.2d 1368 (8th Cir. 1988).
5. 607 F. Supp. at 1458. The Spectrum was the officially recognized school news-
paper at Hazelwood East High School. It was normally published six times a semester
and covered a wide range of topics in the news, sports and entertainment fields. Id. at
1
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advisor Harold Emerson submitted proofs of the final edition to the principal
of Hazelwood East, Robert Reynolds.'
Several articles in the issue dealt with teenage pregnancy and divorce.7
Principal Reynolds found two of the articles objectionable. 8 One dealt with
three Hazelwood students' pregnancies. 9 Although the article mentioned that
the names of the girls had been changed, Mr. Reynolds feared the students
would be easily identified. 10
The other story Mr. Reynolds found objectionable focused on the impact
of divorce on children.1 The article included quotes from a Hazelwood student
which were critical of her father.12 In the proof Mr. Reynolds read, the
1452.
6. Id. at 1458. Mr. Emerson became acting adviser when the previous adviser,
Mr. Robert Stergos, left the employ of the Hazelwood School District on April 29,
1983. Mr. Emerson's other responsibilities at Hazelwood High were yearbook sponsor
and coordinator of school information. Much of the trial court's finding of facts evolve
around his predecessor's, Mr. Stergos', control over the Spectrum.
7. Id. at 1457. There were six articles in all, three spread across the top half of
pages four and five and the other three spread across the bottom half. The stories in the
first group all dealt with teen pregnancies, indeed the headline across pages four and
five read:
Pressure Describes It All For Today's Teenagers
Pregnancy Affects Many Teens Each Year
The first of the stories relied heavily on information from a READER'S DIGE-sT article,
and dealt with teen pregnancy, sexuality, and abortion.
The second article also relied on previously published materials, this time from
THE NEW REPUBLIC. The article focused on "squeal laws," which would require feder-
ally funded clinics to notify parents if a teenager requested birth control assistance.
The last of the first group of articles dealt with the personal experiences of three preg-
nant Hazelwood students. The article began by announcing that the names of the three
girls had been changed. The substance of the report ranged from their own and fami-
lies' reaction to the pregnancies to their own sexual experiences, including the use, or
lack of, birth control devices.
The articles spread across the bottom half of the two pages delved heavily into
divorce. One of the stories dealt with the divorce rate among teenage marriages and
carried a local flavor because a source for the article was a faculty member of the
school. Another article concerned itself with the problem of teenage runaways, its
causes and cures. The third story dealt with the causes and effects of divorce. It also
had a local flavor as Hazelwood High students spoke of their parents' divorces. Each of
the articles was written by a different student.
8. Id. at 1460.
9. Id.
10. Id. Mr. Reynolds felt the number of pregnant students at Hazelwood was so
few (8-10) that the students could not maintain their anonymity. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 1457-58. Several quotes were attributed to Hazelwood students. One in
particular actually identified the student, Diana Herbert. The following quote was at-
tributed to her:
My dad wasn't spending enough time with my mom, my sister and 1. He was
always out of town on business or late playing cards with the guys. My par-
ents always argued about everything. In the beginning I thought I caused the
problem, but now I realized [sic] it wasn't me. 2
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student was identified (unknown to Mr. Reynolds the name had been deleted
in the proofs being sent to the printer). 3 Mr. Reynolds thought it unfair to
publish the article without the father's knowledge and opportunity to
respond. 14
Principal Reynolds actually read the articles while on the phone with Mr.
Emerson on May 11.15 Voicing his concern to Mr. Emerson, Principal Reyn-
olds asked what could be done to delete the stories.'8 Mr. Emerson responded
that the pages on which the two articles appeared could be totally deleted,
thus turning the planned six page paper into a four page edition.' 7 The two
pages included other articles dealing with the same subject matter, but which
Mr. Reynolds had found acceptable.'8
Concluding that the two articles were not suitable for publication and
realizing that with the school year nearing its end, any delay would result in
the entire edition not being published, Principal Reynolds directed Mr. Emer-
son to delete the two pages.' 9 Mr. Reynolds informed his immediate supervi-
sor, assistant superintendent Francis Huss, of his decision.'0 Mr. Huss con-
curred with the principal's action."
The Spectrum staff did not learn of the deletions until May 13, when the
final edition of the paper was delivered to the school.2 2 Staff members of the
Spectrum met with Mr. Reynolds that afternoon. He told them that he felt the
articles were "too sensitive" for "our immature audience of readers. '23
Although the Spectrum staff published the "edited" edition of the paper,
several students copied the deleted (objectionable) articles and handed them
out on the school premises. 24 Those participating in the "underground" distri-
bution were not punished. 25 On May 19, three of the paper's staff members
filed an action in federal district court. The students sought both declaratory
relief and damages arising out of the school administration's decision not to
publish the articles. 26
13. Id. at 1458.
14. Id. at 1460.
15. Id. at 1459. Mr. Emerson called the principal after not hearing from him.
They spent about 20 minutes on the phone, at which time Mr. Reynolds read the
proofs for the first time. Mr. Reynolds was under the mistaken impression that Mr.
Emerson was at the printers, leading to his sense of urgency.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 1457; see supra note 7.





24. Id. at 1459-61.
25. Id. at 1461.
26. Id. at 1450-51. According to the trial court, the issues central to the case, the
constitutional rights of the plaintiffs, were "inextricably intertwined" with the facts to
be determined, thus both the questions of declaratory relief and liability would be de-
1988]
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THE SEARCH FOR APPLICABLE LAW
The district court in Hazelwood recognized that Tinker provides that
public school students do not forfeit their constitutional rights while on the
school premises.2 7 But, the court felt Tinker and other case law establishes
that such rights are not always "coextensive with those of adults."28
The Supreme Court in Tinker set out the standard under which student
speech could not be punished unless it resulted in "substantial disruption of or
material interference with school activities. . . ."' Thus, Tinker resulted in
that ever-present phenomenon of constitutional law, the balancing test. A
claim of student first amendment rights would have to take into account the
unique qualities of the school environment which "accorded wide latitude over
decisions affecting the manner in which [school officials and teachers] educate
students." 30 Would the student speech materially disrupt class work and in-
volve substantial disorder? 3'
The district court separated the cases dealing with student expression into
two areas. The first of those involved expression which occurred on school
property but was "outside of official school programs.' 2 Tinker is in this line
of cases.
In Tinker students wore black arm bands to protest the Vietnam War.33
This was ruled symbolic speech which did not interfere with school activities. 34
The expression, while taking place on school property, was not part of an offi-
cial school program; thus the Court took a dimmer view of the administra-
tion's attempt to silence the speech.
The second group of cases deals with expression that takes place "within
the context of school-sponsored programs. '35 Falling into this category was
termined by the trial judge. The trial court focused solely on the issue of liability.
27. Id. at 1462.
28. Id. (quoting Williams v. Spencer, 622 F.2d 1200, 1205 (4th Cir. 1980)). The
Williams court cited the Tinker case for the proposition that the constitutional rights
of public school students are not coextensive with adults. Actually it was Justice Stew-
art's concurring opinion which stated the proposition, and that came as a criticism of
the majority for not making that distinction. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Commu-
nity School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 515 (1969) (Stewart, J., concurring). In cases follow-
ing Tinker, the Supreme Court did in fact affirm that the rights of public school stu-
dents do not coexist with that of adults in other settings. In a case decided the term
prior to Hazelwood, the Court reaffirmed that distinction. Bethel School Dist. v. Fra-
ser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
29. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514
(1969).
30. Kuhlmeier, 607 F. Supp. at 1462 (quoting Nicholson v. Board of Educ., 682
F.2d 858, 863 (9th Cir. 1982)).
31. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514.
32. Kuhlmeier, 607 F. Supp. at 1462.
33. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514.
34. Id.
35. Kuhlmeier, 607 F. Supp. at 1462.
[Vol. 53
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Seyfreid v. Walton,36 a 1981 case in which the Third Circuit upheld the right
of a high school administration to cancel a school sponsored play based upon
its sexual content.87
A further distinction to which the Hazelwood court alluded was the type
of forum the administrators were trying to regulate. Even if the expression was
tied to the school's curriculum, it should receive a greater degree of constitu-
tional protection if it originated from a "public forum. ' 8 The district court
found this concept a "critical factor" in the Seyfreid case.39
The distinction between non-school sponsored expression as exemplified in
Tinker and school-sponsored speech as illustrated in Seyfreid, is rather
straightforward. The latter distinction, whether or not the school program has
become a "public forum" is a more difficult question. It calls for intensive
inquiry and its resolution may determine whether the expression will be consti-
tutionally protected. Thus, an examination of the framework through which
the courts analyze public forums is necessary.
EXPRESSION ON PUBLIC PROPERTY
In 1939 the United States Supreme Court noted that areas such as streets
and parks "have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and
. . have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts be-
tween citizens, and discussing public questions."'40 These areas are labelled
"traditional" public forums. Any attempt by government to regulate the ex-
pression coming from such areas "must serve a compelling state interest and.
[be] narrowly drawn to achieve that end."'41
At the other end of the spectrum is public property which by "tradition or
36. 668 F.2d. 214 (3d Cir. 1981).
37. In Seyfreid, the superintendent of Caesar Rodney High, a public school, de-
cided to cancel the school's production of the play "Pippin." The decision was based on
his belief that the sexual content of the production was inappropriate for a public high
school. The school board upheld the superintendent's decision.
38. Kuhimeier, 607 F. Supp. at 1464.
39. Id. at 1463. Actually the Seyfreid court never used the term "public forum,"
or for that matter ran through the public forum analysis per se. It used the language
"integral part of school's educational program," which became popular with the trial
court in Hazelwood. The key question for the Third Circuit became: was the play
intended for an educational experience? Seyfreid, 668 F. Supp. at 216.
40. Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939).
41. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
In Perry, a teacher's union opposing the one in power attempted to use the school's
mail system to communicate with the teachers at the school. The union in power had
successfully negotiated with the school board for the exclusive access to the system for
such matters. When the school board disallowed the rival union the use of the system
the union countered that the system was a public forum due to the communicative
access other groups had to it. The Supreme Court ruled, based on its reading of the
facts, the mail system had not taken on the characteristics of a public forum and de-
nied the rival union access.
1988]
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designation" is not a forum for public expression. The Supreme Court has held
that the Constitution does not guarantee access to property just because it is
"owned or controlled by the government.'4 2 The standards by which courts
view governmental attempts to regulate expression in these areas are less strin-
gent than in "public forums." A regulation which is reasonable and not based
on governmental opposition to the view expressed will pass judicial scrutiny.' 3
Jails and military bases are examples of property which fall into this
classification. 4
Between traditional and non-public forums lies a third category which by
its nature is not a traditional public forum but which a governmental body has
designated as available for expressive activity.' 5 While by definition the gov-
ernment was under no obligation to create the forum, judicial review of subse-
quent attempts to regulate expression arising from it must pass the same stan-
dards as in a traditional forum. 46
Courts have ruled public schools are not traditional public forums.'
7
Thus, the question in Hazelwood became whether the Spectrum itself had be-
come a conduit for public expression, thus deserving traditional public forum
status. If so, prior case law would require Principal Reynolds' actions to have
"serve[d] a compelling state interest and . . . [been] narrowly drawn to
achieve that interest.' 48 If not, Mr. Reynolds's action need to have only been
reasonable.
APPLICATION OF THE LAW
The district court ruled that Spectrum was an integral part of the school
curriculum at Hazelwood East, a laboratory for the students enrolled in Jour-
nalism II.49 In making this determination the court considered a number of
factors, including the faculty advisor's control over the paper. The court char-
acterized the power wielded by the advisor as "final authority.s 50
42. Id. at 46 (quoting United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civ-
ics Ass'n, 453 U.S. 114, 129 (1981)).
43. Id.
44. See Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976).
45. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.
46. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267-68 n.5 (1981).
47. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
48. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 270.
49. Kuhlmeier, 607 F. Supp. at 1452-53. For the year in question, 1982-83, Ha-
zelwood East offered two journalism classes in their curriculum. In the fall "Journalism
I" was offered and it dealt with the basics of the print journalist's trade such as "re-
porting, writing, editing, layout, publishing and journalistic ethics." In the spring the
curriculum offered "Journalism II," for which "Journalism I" was a prerequisite.
While students enrolled in "Journalism II" continued to receive instruction in the
"basics," the primary function of the class was the publication of the Spectrum. Both
courses were taught by the Spectrum's advisor, Robert Stergos.
50. Id. at 1453. The trial court found that Mr. Stergos:
selected the editor, assistant editor, layout editor and layout staff. . ., sched-
[Vol. 53
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The court as well gave weight to testimony that the principal previously
had deleted stories, a factor which decreased the likelihood the paper was in-
tended to be a public forum.5' Further, the court considered it specially signifi-
cant that Hazelwood East's curriculum guide and the stated school board pol-
icy on student publications described the newspaper as a curricular activity.52
The court felt both statements demonstrated that Spectrum had not been
opened up for student expression.5 3 Thus, neither policy nor practice supported
the contention that the Spectrum had become a public forum.
Despite finding that the paper was an integral part of the curriculum, the
court acknowledged that "school officials were [not] completely free of con-
straints imposed by the first amendment."' The court then turned its inquiry
to the appropriate standard for weighing the school administration's actions.
The court determined that if the expression occurred outside the school
curriculum, Tinker applied, and the standard would be whether the speech
materially disrupts the legitimate mission of the school. 55 On the other hand, if
the expression originated within the school curriculum, the standard would be
"a substantial and reasonable basis for the action taken. 56
Considering the potential consequences arising from the publication of the
articles and the limited options available to Principal Reynolds, the court
found there was a "reasonable basis for the action taken."5 7 Where the
uled publication dates, decided the number of pages for each issue, assigned
story ideas to class members, counseled students on the development of the
stories, reviewed the use of quotations, edited stories, adjusted layouts, se-
lected the letters to the editor, edited the letters to the editor, called in correc-
tions to the printer, and sold papers from the Journalism II classroom.
While the court conceded some of these decisions were "made in consultation" with the
students, it found many which were not. The court found the plaintiffs were well aware
of the adviser's control over the newspaper.
51. Id. at 1453-54.
52. Id. at 1452, 1454-56. Journalism II was described in the Hazelwood East
Curriculum Guide as "provid[ing] a laboratory situation in which the students publish
the school newspaper applying the skills they have learned in Journalism I."
Of particular import to the trial court was Board Policy 348.51, entitled "School
Sponsored Publications":
School sponsored student publications will not restrict free expression or di-
verse viewpoints within the rules of responsible journalism. School sponsored
publications are developed within the adopted curriculum and its educational
implications and regular classroom activities.
53. Id. passim.
54. Id. at 1466.
55. Id. at 1463.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1466-67. The court concluded the potential "loss of anonymity" to the
three Hazelwood girls would even satisfy the "invasion of the rights of others" aspect
in the Tinker standard. The court put great stock in the expert witness of the school,
Mr. Martin Duggan, a former editor for the St. Louis Globe Democrat. Mr. Duggan
testified that the article about the three pregnant students was inappropriate, as it con-
stituted an invasion of privacy. Mr. Duggan also characterized the divorce story as not
1988]
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school's curriculum is involved "something less than substantial disruption...
may justify prior restraints. . .."58
As the district court below, the Eighth Circuit used a public forum analy-
sis to analyze the case. Unlike the district court, the Eighth Circuit held the
Spectrum to be a public forum.59 Central to the appellate court's ruling was
their determination that the Spectrum "was a 'student publication' in every
sense." 0 They felt the students were in charge. They make the editorial deci-
sions outside the purview of the school administration."
The court felt policy statements published annually in the Spectrum made
it clear it was a student newspaper. The statements announced that publica-
tion decisions would be based on first amendment considerations and that the
content of the paper did not reflect the school administration's or faculty's
views.6 2 These and other factors led the court to conclude the paper "was not
comporting to the "fairness and balance" standard that is expected in the field of jour-
nalism. Id. at 1461.
58. Id. at 1463.
59. Kuhlmeier, 795 F.2d at 1373.
60. Id. at 1372.
61. Id. According to the appellate court, the students made the key editorial de-
cisions, from choosing the staff of the paper to selecting and determining the content of
the articles to be published. The court quoted adviser Stergos' testimony concerning
control of the Spectrum, "It's a student paper, so that the students, first of all, decided
the stories, and, you know, wrote the stories, so they obviously were deciding the con-
tent. They were writing them. I would help if there were any matters that they had
question of, legalwise or ethicalwise, but-." That was the extent of Stergos' testimony
to which the appellate court referred. Obviously their finding of fact was directly
counter to the lower court's as to whom had control of the Spectrum.
62. Id. at 1372 n.3. The statement of policy read as follows:
Spectrum is a school funded newspaper; written, edited, and designed by
members of the Journalism II class with assistance of adviser Mr. Robert
Stergos.
Spectrum follows journalism guidelines that are set out by Scholastic
Journalism textbook. ... The newspaper will not attack any individual. How-
ever, any group, organization or club may be subject to examination and/or
criticism.
All non-by-lined editorials appearing in this newspaper reflect the opin-
ions of the Spectrum staff, which are not necessarily shared by the adminis-
trators or faculty of Hazelwood East. All by-lined editorials reflect only the
opinions of the writer.
Spectrum welcomes all student, faculty and community input, including
suggestions, story ideas, news tips, and letters-to-the-editors. . . .Spectrum
staff will not edit any letters, but all letters may be subject to condensing if
there is a space limitation. A letter will not be printed if it is libelous, ob-
scene, or against the general policy of the newspaper.
Spectrum will be published approximately every three weeks. It will be
sold during the school day for the price of 25 cents.
Spectrum, as a student-press publication, accepts all rights implied by
the First Amendment of the United States Constitution which states that:
"Congress shall make no law restricting ...or abridging the freedom of
speech or the press . .. "
8
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just a class exercise [but] was a public forum established to give students an
opportunity to express their views while gaining an appreciation of their rights
and responsibilities under the First Amendment .... -13
The court of appeals' next question was the "extent" of constitutional
protection the Spectrum deserved, noting that prior case law required content
based regulation to be "narrowly drawn to effectuate a compelling state inter-
est." ' 4 The court conceded that the high school environment invited a "some-
what lower" standard.65 That standard, according to the Eighth Circuit, was
articulated in Tinker. To pass constitutional muster the regulation of the
Spectrum must have been "necessary to avoid material and substantial inter-
ference with school work or discipline ... or the rights of others. '66
The appellate court found no evidence that would have allowed Principal
Reynolds to believe that disruption would have taken place in the school publi-
cation of the articles would disrupt the school in any material way. The court
dismissed as "administrative convenience" the total deletion of the pages con-
taining the two objectionable articles.6 8
Nor did the court give credence to Mr. Reynold's fear that publication
would create the impression that the school endorsed the "sexual norms" of
the students interviewed in the articles.69 The court ruled that opinions voiced
in the extra-curricular paper were "akin to [books found in] the school
That this right extends to high school students was clarified in the Tinker
vs. Des Moines Community School District case in 1969.
Among other indications the Eighth Circuit felt established Spectrum as a public fo-
rum open for the purpose of student expression was a non-by-lined editorial printed in
the January 14, 1980 issue. Entitled "The Right to Write," it read as follows:
Because Spectrum is a member of the press and especially because Spectrum
is the sole press of the student body, Spectrum has a responsibility to that
student body to be fair and unbiased in reporting, to point out injustice and,
thereby, guard student freedoms, and to uphold a high level of journalistic
excellence. This may, at times cause Spectrum to be unpopular with some.
Spectrum is not printed to be popular. Spectrum is printed to inform, enter-
tain, guide and serve the student body - no more, and hopefully, no less.
Id. at 1373.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1374 (citing Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 270 (1981)).
65. Id.
66. Id. The Eighth Circuit cited Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School
Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969) for that standard. Actually the standard appearing on
page 511 in Tinker is "prohibition of expression ... without evidence that it is neces-
sary to avoid material and substantial interference with schoolwork or discipline is not
constitutionally permissible." Two pages later the Tinker Court wrote, "conduct by the
student [that] materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion
of the rights of others is, of course, not immunized by the constitutional guarantee of
freedom of speech." Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513.
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As to the "rights of others" aspect of the Tinker standard, the court ruled
that school officials' application of any "yardstick less exacting than potential
tort liability" could result in curtailing speech at the slightest fear of distur-
bance. 1 17 Finding that no justifiable cause of action would have resulted from
the publication of the articles, the court concluded that censoring the articles
violated the students' first amendment rights.7 2
In a 5-3 decision, the United States Supreme Court overruled the Eighth
Circuit and upheld the district court's original ruling. Like the two courts be-
low, the majority used the public forum framework while giving greater defer-
ence to the district court in its finding that the Spectrum was an integral part
of the curriculum. 7 3
Both the decision of the majority and the reasoning of the dissent are
instructive in divining the current standard of first amendment protection of
expression in public school systems. Is public forum analysis the focal point?
If so, does it differ from the public forum analysis courts apply in non-aca-
demic areas? And, perhaps most importantly, has Tinker been compromised
in such a way that students now abandon their constitutional rights when they
enter the public schools?
The majority first considered whether the Spectrum was a public forum.
The Supreme Court took a deeper look into the case law dealing with public
forums than did the trial or appellate courts. Noting that public schools do not
possess the characteristics of a traditional public forum, the Court quoted one
of its recent rulings stating that, unless by "policy or by practice" the entity
had been opened up "for indiscriminate use by the general public," a public
forum had not been created.7
4
Even though a facility is used for "communications" it is not necessarily a
public forum.75 The creation of a public forum must be intentional and may
not develop through inaction or the allowance of limited discourse. The Court
was careful to point out that the tolerance, or even encouragement, of speech
need not create a public forum.7 6
Looking at the record in Hazelwood, the majority agreed with the trial
court in that a clear intent to create a public forum was not present.7 The
Court stressed that the use of a school activity, such as the Spectrum, to
"teach leadership skills .. . hardly implies a decision to relinquish school
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1376.
72. Id.
73. Kuhlmeier, 508 S. Ct. at 568-69.
74. Id.
75. Id. (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473
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control over that activity."78 Allowing students editorial responsibilities is not
equivalent to the school foregoing a right of control.
In the Court's opinion, the school authorities could regulate "in any rea-
sonable manner. 17 9 "Reasonableness" is the same standard of review the trial
court applied and the accepted standard when dealing with content control in
any non-public forum.s0 The Supreme Court agreed with the trial court that
the actions of the principal were reasonable under the circumstances.8" But the
decision's importance is less the Supreme Court's treatment of Hazelwood's
particular facts, than its determination of the applicable law.
Before leaving the public forum aspect of the case it should be noted the
Supreme Court indicated it would have applied the Tinker standard had it
found Spectrum to be a "public forum."8 2 As discussed, the Supreme Court
previously had ruled that any "content based prohibition [in a public forum]
must be narrowly drawn to effectuate a compelling state interest."88
The Supreme Court never discussed its reasons for finding that Tinker,
rather than the more rigorous public forum standard, would be the proper
standard if Spectrum were a public forum. The Eighth Circuit, addressing the
same point, abandoned "the narrowly drawn . . . compelling state interest"
standard for the "somewhat lower" Tinker review.84 It reasoned the high
school setting invited a somewhat lesser standard of review. 85
Justice Brennan, in his dissent, made the only reference to the more "rig-
orous" standard, but he did not argue to abandon Tinker for it.86 It is interest-
ing to note that Tinker, a case where the question of a public forum was not in
issue, provided the standard of review when courts find a public forum has
been created.
Having concluded Spectrum was not a public forum and Principal Reyn-
old's actions reasonable under the circumstances, the Supreme Court went on
to explore the relationship between student expression and a school adminis-
trator's "legitimate pedagogical concerns." The Court posed the question
whether the first amendment's "requir[ing] a school to tolerate particular stu-
dent speech" is any different from the Constitution "requir[ing] a school af-
firmatively to promote particular student speech. 17
The Court couched the issue as an "educator's ability to silence a
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Kuhlmeier, 607 F. Supp. at 1463; see also Perry Education Ass'n v. Perry
Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983).
81. Kuhlmeier, 508 S. Ct. at 571.
82. Id. at 569. After finding the Spectrum a non-public forum, the Court an-
nounced a reasonableness standard, rather than deciding that Tinker should govern.
83. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
84. Kuhlmeier, 795 F.2d at 1374.
85. Id.
86. Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. at 573.
87. Id. at 569.
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student's personal expression on the school premises" versus "authority over
school sponsored ... expressive activities that ... the public might reasonably
perceive to be the imprimatur of the school."88 The first situation describes
Tinker and the latter Hazelwood.
In Tinker-type situations, as already discussed, administrators may regu-
late student expression to avoid material disruption of classwork, substantial
disorder or invasion of the rights of others. But what about "school sponsored.
expressive activity?"
A legitimate question here might be what difference does it make? If the
entity has become a public forum the Tinker standard applies; if not, a "rea-
sonableness" standard is the test. Given that the district court, Eighth Circuit,
and a majority of the Supreme Court followed this analysis in ruling on Ha-
zelwood, one must wonder if there is any relevance in the Court's new
inquiry?
The Court quickly acknowledged that educators were "entitled to exercise
greater control" over school sponsored expression. 9 The Court articulated
three justifications for this conclusion.90 First is the school's desire to "assure
that participants" get out of the activity what it is "designed to teach." 91 This
parallels the now common "integral part of the curriculum" analysis that was
crucial in the public forum inquiry. Put quite simply, an educator has more
control over an activity which is designed to educate than he/she has over
personal student expression that happens to take place on school premises.
Secondly, the Court acknowledged the school's need to protect its audi-
ences from "material that may be inappropriate for their level of maturity."9 2
In Hazelwood, one of Principal Reynolds' concerns was the articles' effect on
a certain segment of the student audience.93
Finally, the Court granted the school has an interest in making sure the
message is not "erroneously attributed to the school." ' The Court's initial
example of such "disassociation" was from expression that could be character-
ized as "ungrammatical, poorly written, inadequately researched, biased or
prejudiced, vulgar or profane .... -'l It is here the Court seems to be going
further than mere content control, into the area of viewpoint control. What is
"bias or prejudice" but viewpoint?
Later, the majority left no doubt that the school may regulate based on
the particular view expressed. The Court stated, "a school must ... retain the
authority to refuse to sponsor student speech that might reasonably be
88. Id.




93. Id. at 571.




Missouri Law Review, Vol. 53, Iss. 4 [1988], Art. 12
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol53/iss4/12
TO PUBLISH?
perceived to advocate drug or alcohol use, irresponsible sex, or conduct other-
wise inconsistent with 'the shared values of a civilized social order', or to asso-
ciate the school with any position other than neutrality on matters of public
controversy." '96 To publish an article which documents the many drawbacks of
drug use, yet not print one because it trumpets such use, is viewpoint
discrimination.
The Court gave some indication that it views the school regulator as more
akin to a publisher than a governmental entity.97 Nevertheless, it did not ig-
nore the latter status. The Court articulated a standard which any regulation
of school sponsored student expression must satisfy. That standard is that any
regulation of student expression in a school sponsored activity must be "rea-
sonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns." 98 Elsewhere the Court
wrote the first amendment is implicated only if the censorship of the student
expression "has no valid educational purpose." 99
This brings the analysis back to square one. If governmental property is
not a public forum the standard by which the courts review any regulation is
"reasonable." If expression is school sponsored, the regulation must be "rea-
sonably related to legitimate pedagogical concern." Does the result of the
Court's second inquiry differ in any significant way from the result a court
would reach under public forum analysis?
In Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Educator's Association00
the Supreme Court held regulation in a non-public forum is constitutional as
long as it "is reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression merely be-
cause public officials oppose the speaker's view."' 011 Taking the statement in
Perry as the Court's interpretation of what would be impermissible regulation
under public forum analysis, the newly articulated concept seems to grant con-
stitutional authority to suppress expression for what was a previously prohib-
ited reason--official opposition to the "speakers view." In that new authority is
found the relevance of the Court's "new inquiry" noted above.
Certainly the dissent felt the majority had moved too far in that direction.
Like the Eighth Circuit, the dissent saw Spectrum as a forum for student
expression and Tinker as the proper standard.0 2 But the majority's distinction
between personal student speech on the school premises and school sponsored
speech was the point on which the dissent turned its guns.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 571.
99. Id.
100. 460 U.S. 37 (1982).
101. Id. at 46 (citing United States Postal Serv. v. Greenburgh Civic Ass'n, 453
U.S. 114, 131 n.7 (1981)).
102. Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. at 573 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissent, like the
Eighth Circuit, found statements of policy by the school board and Spectrum itself
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It argued the majority's new analysis allowed "unabashed and unconstitu-
tional viewpoint discrimination."103 The dissent felt if "mere incompatibility
with the school's pedagogical message" were sufficient to constitutionally cen-
sor student expression, public schools would be converted into "enclaves of
totalitarianism."'1'
The dissent was faithful to Tinker throughout its analysis. It asserted that
Tinker addressed the control over curriculum concern of the majority. Unless
the expression would "materially disrupt[] classwork or involve[] substantial
disorder" the regulation would be unconstitutional. 15
The dissent's only deviation from the Tinker standard would have
strengthened the test rather than weakened it. Under this caveat, if a school
feels the need to dissociate itself from student expression, the dissent focuses
on the "less oppressive alternatives" which administrators could use.100 Such a
focus is the same as that of the "narrowly tailored" requirement the Court
employs in other areas of freedom of expression.107
The dissent deemed the educator's need to protect the audience as "ille-
gitimate."' 08 By so allowing schools to justify restraints on expression, the dis-
sent feared administrators would be able to censor expression based on the
view expressed. 09
On this point, the majority did sanction censoring of at least one Spec-
trum article due to the message conveyed. As the dissent noted, Principal
Reynolds found other articles dealing with much the same subject matter as
one of the deleted articles acceptable. 10 The particular message conveyed in
one of the deleted articles and its potential effect on its immature audience
prompted the principal to censor it."'
Thus, the crux of the case comes down to the distinction the majority
makes between school sponsored expression and personal speech taking place
on school premises. Finding the school's role more akin to a publisher in the
former role, the court now allows regulation where neither Tinker nor public
forum analysis would.
It is possible a student newspaper could be school sponsored yet by
103. Id. at 578.
104. Id. at 574 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511).
105. Id. at 575 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513).
106. Id. at 579. The dissent felt the administration could have achieved their
goal by requiring the students to publish a disclaimer or "even issue our response clari-
fying the official position." The dissent characterized the actions in Hazelwood as "bru-
tal censorship." Id.
107. See supra notes 41 and 83 and accompanying text.
108. Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. at 576 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 577-79. The dissent argued Hazelwood itself showed how officials
could use the protection argument to "camouflage viewpoint discrimination." Id. at
578.
110. Id. at 579.
111. Kuhlmeier, 607 F. Supp. at 1459.
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"policy and practice" become a vehicle for student expression. The Third Cir-
cuit so held several years ago in a similar situation.1 2 But if such a situation
arises after Hazelwood, what standard applies? Public forum, where viewpoint
discrimination seems to be prohibited, or school sponsored, where viewpoint
discrimination is constitutional? Does the mere fact the paper is school spon-
sored and used for an educational purpose automatically allow an educator's
regulation to be reviewed by the more differential standard?
A rather ironic situation exists regardless of the analysis or standard used.
Say, for instance, the Spectrum had been found a public forum by the Su-
preme Court, the Tinker standard had been applied and the students had won
the case. Following the Court's holding the school could have closed the Spec-
trum (forum) down.
A public forum which is not "traditional" attains its status by "designa-
tion." The government designated through "policy and practice" the entity to
be a forum for public expression. While a court may rule the government vio-
lated a particular plaintiff's constitutional rights because the entity is a public
forum, it is well established the government is under no obligation to keep the
"forum" open.1"3 The dissent conceded this very point." 4 What an official once
giveth, he can taketh away.
In crafting the powers a school administrator should have over school
sponsored expression, should the administrator have more discretion than the
ultimate power, that of shutting the forum down completely? Would student
expression actually be fostered by such a result? The majority felt if the only
available option for the school was the complete shut down of the forum, stu-
dents would be the ones to suffer.
Looked at another way, would a school administrator, knowing his/her
only alternative to control school sponsored student expression was to meet the
Tinker standard, just avoid such a situation by never offering students an op-
portunity to express themselves? Could the dissent's position actually having a
"chilling effect" on the school providing students any type of vehicle for
expression?
The majority has not actually abdicated constitutional standards in their
holding. A high school administrator is still not the equivalent of a private
publisher. The actions of the administrator must still be "reasonable.""' 5
While this may not be reassuring, "reasonableness" standards are the staple of
the American legal system, including constitutional analysis." 6
112. See supra note 39.
113. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.
114. Kuhimeier, 108 S. Ct. at 579.
115. Id. at 578.
116. As this paper has previously pointed out, non-public forums are regulated
by a reasonableness standard. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 46. Much of the foundation of
negligence law is based on the reasonable person standard, as are other areas of tort
law. See generally W. PROSSER & P. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 32, at 173-75 (5th ed. 1984).
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It could be "reasonable" to "disassociate" the school from school-spon-
sored student expression which advocates drug usage, or homosexuality. On
the other hand, would it be "reasonable" to censor an article because it could
be understood as advocating an increase in funding to the homeless or decreas-
ing the national commitment to NATO?
Regardless of how they label it, the majority has sanctioned viewpoint
discrimination. This seems to contrast with past rulings. In a 1982 case the
Supreme Court held school officials could not remove books from the public
library due to official disapproval of the ideas they convey. 11 The Hazelwood
Court does not extend to school sponsored newspapers the status bestowed
upon school libraries. Can a principled distinction be made between books
found in the school library and articles found in a school sponsored
newspaper?
Has the Hazelwood court abandoned Tinker? The better argument is no.
The Court merely has failed to extend it. In the previous term, the Court also
refused to extend the Tinker standard to a student's making "lewd remarks"
at a high school assembly.118
The basis for the Court's analysis is the distinction between personal stu-
dent speech taking place on the school premises and student speech articulated
in a school sponsored activity. The Court has determined the latter deserves a
more deferential review when the school administrator deems it necessary to
protect the audience, to preserve the integrity of the curriculum, or to disasso-
ciate the school from the message expressed. The decision's propriety, or lack
thereof, lies not in whether the distinction is pricipled but rather in whether it
is constitutional.
RANDY BAKER
117. Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
118. Bethel School Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
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